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Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games
and Affine Equilibria
Serkan Sarıtas¸, Serdar Yu¨ksel, and Sinan Gezici
Abstract—This paper studies the decentralized quadratic
cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and
a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned
objective functions. The main contributions of this study are
the extension of Crawford and Sobel’s cheap talk formulation
to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We
consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential)
Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar
sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature
of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense
that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by
quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg
equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional
setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may
be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy
setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive
Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder
are misaligned by a bias term and encoder’s cost also includes
a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of
affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria
are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg
equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are
scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine
policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control
problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active
information transmission in strategic environments.
Index Terms—Information theory, game theory, signaling
games, cheap talk, quantization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Team theory is concerned with the interaction dynamics
among decentralized decision makers with identical ob-
jective functions. On the other hand, game theory deals
with setups with misaligned objective functions, where each
player chooses a strategy to maximize its own utility which
is determined by the joint strategies chosen by all players. In-
formation transmission in team problems is well-understood
with extensive publications present in the literature; for a
detailed account we refer the reader to [1]. Despite the
difficulty to obtain solutions under general information struc-
tures, it is evident in team problems that more information
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provided to any of the decision makers does not hurt the
system performance and there is a well-defined partial order
of information structures as studied by Blackwell [2] and
others. However, for general non-zero sum game problems,
informational aspects are very challenging to address; more
information can hurt some or even all of the players in
a system, see e.g. [3]. Further intricacies on informational
aspects in competitive setups have been discussed in [4], [5]
and [6].
Signaling games and cheap talk are concerned with a
class of Bayesian games where an informed decision maker
transmits information to another decision maker. Unlike a
team setup, however, the goals of the agents are misaligned.
Such a study has been initiated by Crawford and Sobel [7],
who obtained the striking result that under some technical
conditions on the utility functions of the decision makers,
the cheap talk problem only admits equilibrium policies that
are essentially quantization policies. This is in significant
contrast with the case where the utility functions are aligned.
The cheap talk and signaling game problems find applica-
tions in networked control systems when a communication
channel/network is present among competitive and non-
cooperative decision makers [8]. For example, in a smart
grid application, there may be strategic sensors in the
system [9] that wish to alter the equilibrium decisions at a
controller receiving data from the sensors to lead to a more
desirable equilibrium, for example by enforcing an outcome
to enhance its prolonged use in the system. One may also
consider a utility company which wishes to inform users
regarding pricing information; if the utility company and
the users engage in selfish behaviour, it may be beneficial
for the utility company to hide certain information and the
users to be strategic about how they interpret the given
information. One further area of application is recommender
systems (as in rating agencies) [10]. All of these applications
lead to a drastically new framework where the value of
information and its utilization are very fragile to the system
under consideration and our study here is an initiator for
such a general setup.
Even though in this paper we only consider quadratic
criteria under a bias term leading to a misalignment, the
contrast with the case where there is no bias (that has been
heavily studied in the information theory literature) raises a
number of sharp conclusions for system designers working
on networked systems under competitive environments.
Identifying when optimal policies are linear or affine for
2decentralized systems involving Gaussian variables under
quadratic criteria is a recurring problem in control theory,
starting perhaps from the seminal work of Witsenhausen
[11], where suboptimality of linear policies for such prob-
lems under non-classical information structures is presented.
The reader is referred to Chapters 3 and 11 of [1] for
a detailed discussion on when affine policies are and are
not optimal. These include the problem of communicating
a Gaussian source over a Gaussian channel, variations of
Witsenhausen’s counterexample [12]; and game theoretic
variations of such problems. For example if the noise vari-
able is viewed as the maximizer and the encoders/decoders
(or the controllers) act as the minimizer, then affine policies
may be optimal for a class of settings, see [13]–[17].
[17] also provides a review on Linear Quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) problems under nonclassical information including
Witsenhausen’s counterexample. Our study provides further
conditions on when affine policies may constitute equilib-
ria for such decentralized quadratic Gaussian optimization
problems.
There have been a number of related contributions in
the economics literature in addition to the seminal work
by Crawford and Sobel, which we briefly review in the
following: Reference [18] shows that even if the sender
and the receiver have identical preferences, perfect com-
munication may not be possible in an equilibrium because
information transmission may be costly. Reference [19]
studies the setup in [7] with two senders and shows that
if senders transmit the messages sequentially once, then
the equilibrium is always quantized and if senders transmit
the messages simultaneously and their biases are either
both positive or both negative, then a fully revealed equi-
librium is possible. Reference [20] studies a scalar setup
and proves that if multiple senders transmit the messages
sequentially and their biases have opposite signs, then a fully
revealed equilibrium is possible; this study also considers
two-dimensional real valued sources, and shows that a fully
revealed equilibrium occurs if and only if the multiple
senders have perfectly opposing biases. Moreover, multi-
dimensional cheap talk with multiple senders is analyzed in
[21] and [22] with unbounded and bounded state spaces,
respectively. The study in [23] considers a special noisy
channel setup between the sender and receiver, and shows
that there may be infinitely many actions (countable or
uncountable) induced in an equilibrium even though all
equilibria are interval partitions in the noiseless case [7].
Conditions for Nash equilibria are investigated in [24] for
a scenario in which there exists a discrete noisy channel
between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver,
and the source is finitely valued. Furthermore, there are some
contributions which modify the information structure given
in Crawford and Sobel’s setup: In [25], the sender knows
that the receiver has partial information about his/her private
information; whereas the sender does not know this in [26],
[27]. Reference [28] studies Crawford and Sobel’s setup in a
finite horizon environment where, in each period, a privately
informed sender transmits a message and a receiver takes an
action. For a detailed literature review on communication
between informed experts and uninformed decision makers,
we refer the reader to [29]. We note also that in the area of
information theory, there exists a vast literature on security
aspects of information transmission, see e.g., [30], [31].
Game theoretic analysis is also useful in various contexts
involving security problems. For example, the security of
the smart-grid infrastructure can be analyzed by considering
the adversarial nature of the interaction between an attacker
and a defender [32], [33], and a game theoretic setup would
be appropriate to analyze such interactions. For an overview
of security and privacy problems in computer networks that
are analyzed within a game-theoretic framework, [34] can
be referred.
In the control community, recently, there have been few
studies: [35] considered a Gaussian cheap talk game with
quadratic cost functions where the analysis considers Stack-
elberg equilibria, for a class of single- and multi-terminal
setups and where linear equilibria have been studied. For
the setup of Crawford and Sobel but when the source
admits an exponentially distributed real random variable,
[36] establishes the discrete-nature of equilibria, and obtains
the equilibrium bins with finite upper bounds on the number
of bins under any equilibrium in addition to some structural
results on informative equilibria for general sources.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this study are as follows.
We prove that for any scalar source, all Nash equilibrium
policies at the encoder are equivalent to some quantized
policy, but all Stackelberg equilibrium policies are fully
informative. That is, there is some information hiding for the
Nash setup, as opposed to the Stackelberg setup. We show
that for multi-dimensional setups, however, unlike the scalar
case, Nash equilibrium policies may be non-quantized and
can in fact be linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source
is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The
goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a
bias term and encoder’s cost also includes a penalty term
of the transmitted signal. Conditions for the existence of
affine equilibrium policies as well as general informative
Nash equilibria are presented for both the scalar and multi-
dimensional setups. We compare the results with socially
optimal costs and information theoretic lower bounds, and
discuss the effects of the bias term on equilibria. Further-
more, we prove that the only equilibrium in the Stackelberg
noisy setup is the linear equilibrium for the scalar case.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let there be two decision makers (DMs): An encoder (DM
1) and a decoder (DM 2) as shown in Fig. 1. DM 1 wishes to
encode the M-valued random variable M to DM 2. Let X
denote the X-valued random variable which is transmitted
to DM 2. DM 2, upon receiving X , generates its optimal
decision U which we also take to be M-valued. We allow
3for randomized decisions, therefore, we let the policy space
of DM 1 be the set of all stochastic kernels from M to X.1
Let Γe denote the set of all such policies. We let the policy
space of DM 2 be the set of all stochastic kernels from X
to M. Let Γd denote the set of all such stochastic kernels.
Fig. 1: General system model for noiseless case.
Given γe ∈ Γe and γd ∈ Γd, the goal in the classical
communications theory is to minimize the expectation
J(γe, γd) =
∫
c(m,u)γe(dx|m)γd(du|x)P (dm),
where c is some cost function. One very common case is
the setup with c(m,u) = |m− u|2.
Recall that a collection of decision makers who have an
agreement on the probabilistic description of a system and a
cost function to be minimized, but who may have different
on-line information is said to be a team (see, e.g. [1]). Hence,
the classical communications setup may be viewed as a team
of an encoder and a decoder.
In many applications (in networked systems, recommen-
dation systems, and applications in economics) the objec-
tives of the encoder and the decoder may not be aligned.
For example, DM 1 may aim to minimize
Je(γe, γd) =
∫
ce(m,u)γe(dx|m)γd(du|x)P (dm) ,
whereas DM 2 may aim to minimize
Jd(γe, γd) =
∫
cd(m,u)γe(dx|m)γd(du|x)P (dm) .
In this study, the problems are investigated where the en-
coder and the decoder are deterministic rather than ran-
domized; i.e., γe(dx|m) = 1{fe(m)∈dx} and γd(du|x) =
1{fd(x)∈du} where 1{D} denotes the indicator function of
an event D, and fe(m) and fd(x) are some deterministic
functions of the encoder and decoder, respectively. Such
a problem is known in the economics literature as cheap
talk (the transmitted signal does not affect the cost, that is
why the game is named as cheap talk). A more general
formulation would be the case when the transmitted signal
is also an explicit part of the cost function ce or cd; in that
case, the setup is called a signaling game. We will consider
a noisy communication setup, where the problem may be
viewed as a signaling game, rather than cheap talk, later in
this study.
Since the goals are not aligned, such a problem is studied
under the tools and concepts provided by game theory. A
1Recall that P is a stochastic kernel from M to X if P (·|m) is a
probability measure on B(X) for every m ∈ M and for every Borel
A ∈ B(X), P (A|·) is a Borel measurable function of m.
pair of policies γ∗,e, γ∗,d is said to be a Nash equilibrium
if
Je(γ∗,e, γ∗,d) ≤ Je(γe, γ∗,d) ∀γe ∈ Γe ,
Jd(γ∗,e, γ∗,d) ≤ Jd(γ∗,e, γd) ∀γd ∈ Γd .
We note that when ce = cd the setup is a traditional
communication theoretic setup. If ce = −cd, that is, if the
setup is a zero-sum game, then an equilibrium is achieved
when γe is non-informative (e.g., a kernel with actions
statistically independent of the source) and γd uses only
the prior information (since the received information is non-
informative). We call such an equilibrium a non-informative
(babbling) equilibrium. The following is a useful observa-
tion, which follows from [7]:
Proposition 2.1: A non-informative (babbling) equilib-
rium always exists for the cheap talk game.
In the discussion so far, a simultaneous game-play is
assumed and thus equilibrium refers to a Nash equilibrium.
Besides the simultaneous game-play, one can also consider
a sequential game-play; i.e. first the encoder sends the
message, then the decoder receives it and takes an action
sequentially while first the encoder’s policy is announced.
Stackelberg equilibria arise in this case. In the Stackelberg
game, the encoder announces his coding strategy and since
the decoder takes an action after receiving the message,
the encoder knows the optimal action which will be taken
by the decoder and chooses the message to be transmitted
accordingly. A pair of policies γ∗,e, γ∗,d is said to be a
Stackelberg equilibrium if
Je(γ∗,e, γ∗,d(γ∗,e)) ≤ Je(γe, γ∗,d(γe)) ∀γe ∈ Γe ,
where γ∗,d(γe) satisfies
Jd(γe, γ∗,d(γe)) ≤ Jd(γe, γd(γe)) ∀γd ∈ Γd.
Throughout the paper, all equilibrium terms refer to the Nash
equilibrium unless otherwise stated; it will be separately
indicated for the Stackelberg game setup and equilibrium.
Crawford and Sobel [7] have made foundational contribu-
tions to the study of cheap talk with misaligned objectives
where the cost functions ce and cd satisfy certain monotonic-
ity and differentiability properties but there is a bias term in
the cost functions. Their result is that the number of bins
in an equilibrium is upper bounded by a function which is
negatively correlated to the bias.
We will first consider the scalar setting by taking the
cost functions as ce (m,u) = (m− u− b)2 and cd (m,u) =
(m− u)2 where b denotes the bias term. The motivation for
such functions stems from the fields of information theory,
communication theory and LQG control; for these fields
quadratic criteria are extremely important. Recall that for the
case with b = 0, the cost functions simply reduce to those
for a minimum mean-square estimation (MMSE) problem.
III. QUADRATIC CHEAP TALK
A. Nash Equilibria in the Scalar Case
As before, let the cost functions be defined as
cd (m,u) = (m− u)2 and ce (m,u) = (m− u− b)2 where
4b is the bias term. Some existence and deterministic prop-
erties of the equilibrium policies of the encoder and the
decoder are stated in [36] and [1, Chp.4].
Theorem 3.1: [36] (i) For any γe, there exists an optimal
γd, which is deterministic. (ii) For any γd, any randomized
encoding policy can be replaced with a deterministic γe
without any loss to DM 1. (iii) Suppose γe is an M -cell
quantizer, then there exists an optimal γd, which is the
conditional expectation of the respective bin.
The following builds on [7, Lem.1], which considers
sources on [0, 1] that admit densities. We note that the
analysis here applies to arbitrary scalar valued random
variables. The proofs essentially follow from [7].
Theorem 3.2: Let m be a real-valued random variable
with an arbitrary probability measure. Let the strategy set
of the encoder (DM 1) consists of the set of all measurable
(deterministic) functions from M to X. Then, an equilibrium
encoder policy has to be quantized almost surely, that is, it is
equivalent to a quantized policy for the encoder in the sense
that the performance of any equilibrium encoder policy is
equivalent to the performance of a quantized encoder policy.
Furthermore, the quantization bins are convex.
Proof: Let there be an equilibrium in the game (with
possibly uncountably infinitely many bins, countably many
bins or finitely many bins). Let two bins be Bα and Bβ.
Also let mα indicate any point in Bα; i.e., mα ∈ Bα.
Similarly, let mβ represent any point in Bβ; i.e., mβ ∈ Bβ.
The decoder chooses action uα = E[m|m ∈ Bα] when the
encoder sends mα ∈ Bα and action uβ = E[m|m ∈ Bβ]
when the encoder sends mβ ∈ Bβ in order to minimize
its total cost. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that uα < uβ . Let F (m,u) , (m − u − b)2. Because of
the equilibrium definitions from the view of the encoder;
F (mα, uα) < F (mα, uβ) and F (mβ , uβ) < F (mβ, uα).
Hence, ∃ m that satisfies F (m,uα) = F (m,uβ) which
reduces to
m =
uα + uβ
2
+ b ⇐⇒ (m− uα) = (uβ −m) + 2b (1)
Since F (m+∆, uα) > F (m+∆, uβ) for any ∆ > 0, Bβ and
{m|m < m} are disjoint sets. Similarly, Bα and {m|m >
m} are disjoint sets, too. Thus, from the definitions of uα
and uβ , we have uα < m < uβ which implies m− uα > 0
and uβ −m > 0. Then, from (1),
uβ − uα = (uβ −m) + (m− uα) = 2(uβ −m) + 2b
> 2b
and
uβ − uα = (uβ −m) + (m− uα) = 2(m− uα)− 2b
> −2b
are obtained. Hence, uβ − uα > 2|b|, which implies that
there must be at least 2|b| distance between the equilibrium
points (decoder’s actions, centroids of the bins). Further,
from the encoder’s point of view, given any two bins Bα
and Bβ , there exists a point m which lies between these
two bins. This assures that each bin must be a single
interval; i.e., convex cell except for a possible insignificant
set of points with measure zero. Since there is an injective
and monotonic relation between the convex cells of the
encoder and decoder’s actions, the equilibrium policy must
be quantized almost surely.
Recall again that for the case when the source admits
density on [0, 1], Crawford and Sobel established the discrete
nature of the equilibrium policies. For the case when the
source is exponential, [36] established the discrete-nature,
and obtained the equilibrium bins with finite upper bounds
on the number of bins in any equilibrium.
B. Stackelberg Equilibria in the Scalar Case
We will now observe that the Stackelberg setup is less
interesting.
Theorem 3.3: The Stackelberg equilibrium is unique and
corresponds to a fully revealing (fully informative) encoder
policy.
Proof: Due to the Stackelberg assumption, the encoder
knows that the decoder will use γd(x) = u = E[m|x] as an
optimal decoder policy to minimize its cost. Then the goal
of the encoder is to minimize the following:
min
x=γe(m)
E[(m − u− b)2] = min
x=γe(m)
E[(m− E[m|x] − b)2]
= min
x=γe(m)
E[(m− E[m|x])2] + b2
= min
x=γe(m)
E[(m− u)2] + b2 .
Here, the second equality follows from the law of the iterated
expectations. Since the goal of the decoder is to minimize
minu=γd(x) E[(m − u)
2], the goals of the encoder and the
decoder become essentially the same in the Stackelberg
game setup, which effectively reduces the game setup to
a team setup. In the team setup, the equilibrium is fully
informative; i.e. the encoder reveals all of its information.
C. Multi-Dimensional Cheap Talk: Nash Equilibria
Our goal in this subsection is to show that it is possible to
have linear equilibria in a multi-dimensional quadratic cheap
talk, unlike the scalar setup. Let the source be uniform on
[0, 1]× [0, 1] and the cost function of the encoder be defined
by ce(~m, ~u) = ‖~m − ~u − ~b‖2 and the cost function of the
decoder be defined by cd(~m, ~u) = ‖~m − ~u‖2 where the
lengths of the vectors are defined in L2 norm and ~b is the
bias vector. For such a scenario, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.4: An equilibrium policy can be non-discrete
and even linear.
Proof: It suffices to provide an example. Consider ~b =
[0.3 0]. Then, as a (properly interpreted) limit case of the
equilibrium in Fig. 2, the following encoder and decoder
policies form an equilibrium:
γe(m1,m2) = (x1, x2) = (0,m2) ,
γd(x1, x2) = (u1, u2) = (0.5,m2) .
5Here, the scalar setup is applied on the x-dimension with
one quantization bin (recall that u1 = E[m1|x1]), and
a fully-informative equilibrium exists on the y-dimension
since there is no bias on that dimension. It is observed that
the encoder policy is linear due to the unbiased property of
the y-dimension.
Fig. 2: There is 1 quantization level on the x-dimension
and 200 quantization levels on the y-dimension. The number
of quantization levels on the y-dimension can be arbitrarily
chosen (since ~b is orthogonal to that dimension). As the
number of levels goes to infinity, this construction converges
to the structure of a linear equilibrium.
Besides linear equilibria, there may be multiple (hence,
non-unique) quantized equilibria with finite regions in the
multi-dimensional case as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Sample equilibria in 2D with ~bx = 0.1 and ~by =
0.2 where the crosses indicate the centroids of the bins, the
star indicates the middle point and the square indicates the
shifted middle point.
From the discussion above, it can be deduced that if
~b is orthogonal to the basis vectors or satisfies certain
symmetry conditions, then non-discrete or linear equilibria
exist. This approach applies also to the n-dimensional setup
for any n ∈ N. For example, if the bias vector involves
only one nonzero coordinate component and if the source
distribution is uniform over an n-dimensional unit cube, then
full information revelation in all the other coordinates will
lead to a non-discrete equilibrium. In particular, if nonzero
component of the bias is greater than 0.25, then there is only
one bin in that coordinate and the full information is sent
in other coordinates. Furthermore, if the encoder only sends
the 0 variable for the value of the only bin in the coordinate
for which the bias has nonzero component, then what we
have is indeed a linear policy.
D. Multi-Dimensional Cheap Talk: Stackelberg Equilibria
The Stackelberg equilibria in the multi-dimensional cheap
talk can be obtained by extending its scalar case; i.e.,
it is unique and corresponds to a fully revealing (fully
informative) encoder policy as in the scalar case. Thus,
Theorem 3.3 holds for the multi-dimensional case as well.
IV. QUADRATIC SIGNALING GAME: SCALAR CASE
The noisy game setup is similar to the noiseless case
except that there exists an additive Gaussian noise channel
between the encoder and decoder, as shown in Fig. 4, and
the encoder has a soft power constraint.
Fig. 4: General system model for noisy case.
The encoder (DM 1) encodes a zero-mean Gaussian ran-
dom variable M and sends the real-valued random variable
X . During the transmission, the zero mean Gaussian noise
with a variance of σ2 is added to X ; hence, the decoder (DM
2) receives Y = X +W . The policy space of DM 1, Γe, is
similarly defined as the policy space in the noiseless case:
the set of stochastic kernels from R to R (this can be viewed
as the measurable subset of the space of all product measures
on R2 with a fixed input marginal, under the weak topology).
The policy space of DM 2, Γd, is the set of stochastic kernels
from R to R. The cost functions of the encoder and the
decoder are also slightly modified as follows: DM 1 aims to
minimize
Je(γe, γd)
=
∫
ce(m,x, u)γe(dx|m)γd(du|y)P (dy|x)P (dm),
whereas DM 2 aims to minimize
Jd(γe, γd)
=
∫
cd(m,u)γe(dx|m)γd(du|y)P (dy|x)P (dm),
where P (dy|x) = P (W ∈ dy − x) with W ∼
N (0, σ2). The cost functions are modified as ce (m,x, u) =
(m− u− b)2 +λx2 and cd (m,u) = (m− u)2. Note that a
power constraint with an associated multiplier is appended to
the cost function of the encoder, which corresponds to power
limitation for transmitters in practice. If λ = 0, this corre-
sponds to the setup with no power constraint at the encoder.
Here, as earlier, the signaling game problem is investigated
6where the encoder and the decoder are deterministic; i.e.,
γe(dx|m) = 1{fe(m)∈dx} and γd(du|y) = 1{fd(y)∈du}
where fe(m) and fd(y) are some deterministic functions
of the encoder and decoder, respectively.
A. A Supporting Result
Suppose that there is an equilibrium with an arbitrary
policy leading to finite (at least two), countably infinite or
uncountably infinite equilibrium bins. Let two of these bins
be Bα and Bβ . Also let mα indicate any point in Bα; i.e.,
mα ∈ Bα; and the encoder encodes mα to xα and sends
to the decoder. Similarly, let mβ represent any point in Bβ;
i.e., mβ ∈ Bβ; and the encoder encodes mβ to xβ and
sends to the decoder. Without any loss of generality, we
can assume that mα < mβ . The decoder chooses the action
u = E [m|y] (MMSE rule). Let F (m,x) be the encoder cost
when message m is encoded as x; i.e.,
F (m,x) =
∫
y
p
(
γd (y) = u
∣∣γe (m) = x)
×
(
(m− u− b)2 + λx2
)
dy .
Then the equilibrium definitions from the view of the en-
coder requires F (mα, xα) ≤ F (mα, xβ) and F (mβ , xβ) ≤
F (mβ , xα). Now let G(m) = F (m,xα) − F (m,xβ). If
it can be shown that G(m) is a continuous function of
m on the interval [mα,mβ ], then it can be deduced that
∃m ∈ [mα,mβ ] such that G(m) = 0 by the Mean Value
Theorem since G(mα) ≤ 0 and G(mβ) ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.1: G(m) is a continuous function of m on
the interval [mα,mβ].
Proof: It suffices to show that F (m,x) is continuous in
m. Let {mn} be a sequence which converges to m. Recall
that (mn − u − b)2 ≤ 2m2n + 2(u + b)2 < ∞ since m
is bounded from above and below (m ∈ [mα,mβ]), b is
a finite bias and E[u2] = E[(γd (y))2] < ∞ (note that any
finite cost E[(m−u2)] inevitably leads to a finite E[u2] since
E[u2] = E[(m+u−m)2] ≤ 2E[m2]+ 2E[(m−u2)] <∞).
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem,
lim
n→∞
F (mn, x) = lim
n→∞
∫
y
p
(
γd (y) = u
∣∣γe (mn) = x)
×
(
(mn − u− b)
2 + λx2
)
dy
=
∫
y
p
(
γd (y) = u
∣∣γe (m) = x)
×
(
(m− u− b)2 + λx2
)
dy = F (m,x) ,
which shows the continuity of F (·, x) in the interval
(mα,mβ).
From Proposition 4.1, ∃m ∈ [mα,mβ ] such that G(m) =
0 which implies F (m,xα) = F (m,xβ). Then∫
yp
(
γd (y) = u
∣∣γe (m) = xα)
×((m− u− b)2 + λ(xα)2)dy
=
∫
y
p
(
γd (y) = u
∣∣γe (m) = xβ)
×((m− u− b)2 + λ(xβ)2)dy.
As a result,
m =
E[(γd(y))2|xβ ]− E[(γd(y))2|xα]
2 (E[γd(y)|xβ ]− E[γd(y)|xα])
+
λ
(
(xβ)2 − (xα)2
)
2 (E[γd(y)|xβ ]− E[γd(y)|xα])
+ b (2)
is obtained. Recall that the arguments in Theorem 3.2 cannot
be applied here because of the presence of noise. However,
when there is noise in a communication channel, the relation
between E[u|x], E[u2|x] and m can be constructed as in (2).
B. Existence and Uniqueness of Informative Equilibria and
Affine Equilibria
We first note that Proposition 2.1 is valid also in the noisy
formulation; i.e. a non-informative (babbling) equilibrium
is an equilibrium for the noisy signaling game, since the
appended power constraint is always positive. The following
holds:
Theorem 4.1:
1) Let 0 < λ < E[m2]
E[w2] . For any b ∈ R, there exists a
unique informative affine equilibrium.
2) If λ ≥ E[m2]
E[w2] , there does not exist an informative
(affine or non-linear or even randomized) equilibrium.
The only equilibrium is the non-informative one.
3) If λ = 0, there exists no informative equilibrium with
affine policies.
Before presenting the proof, we make the following remark.
Remark 4.1: The expression E[m
2]
E[w2] defines a quantity
which determines the Shannon-theoretic capacity of the
channel given a signal energy constraint at the encoder. This
can be interpreted as Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the
received signal, which is related to the channel attenuation
coefficient. If the multiplier of the signal λ in the cost
function is greater than E[m
2]
E[w2] , it will not be rational for
the encoder to send any signal at all under any equilibrium.
Proof:
1) If the encoder is linear (affine), the decoder, as an
MMSE decoder for a Gaussian source over a Gaussian
channel, is linear (affine); this follows from the prop-
erty of the conditional expectation for jointly Gaussian
random variables. Suppose on the other hand that the
decoder is affine so that u = γd(y) = Ky + L and
the encoder policy is x = γe(m). We will show
that the encoder is also affine in this case: With
y = γe(m)+w, it follows that u = Kγe(m)+Kw+L.
By completing the square, the optimal cost of the
encoder can be written as
J∗,e = min
x=γe(m)
E[(m− u− b)2 + λx2]
= min
γe(m)
(K2 + λ)E
[(
γe(m)−
(m− L− b)K
K2 + λ
)2]
+
λ
K2 + λ
(
E[m2] + (L+ b)2
)
+K2E[w2] .
7Hence, the optimal γe(m) can be chosen as
γ∗,e(m) =
(m− L− b)K
K2 + λ
=
(m− L− b)
K + λ/K
, (3)
and the minimum encoder cost is obtained as
J∗,e =
λ
K2 + λ
(
E[m2] + (L+ b)2
)
+K2E[w2] .
(4)
Recall that (3) implies that an optimal encoder policy
for a Gaussian source over a Gaussian channel is an
affine policy if the decoder policy is chosen as affine.
We now wish to see if these sets of policies satisfy
a fixed point equation. If the decoder has an affine
policy, it is proved that the optimal policy of the
encoder is also affine :
γe(m) = Am+ C =
( 1
K + λ/K
)
m+
( −L− b
K + λ/K
)
.
(5)
On the other hand, with the given affine encoding
policy x = γe(m) = Am + C, the optimal decoder
policy would be
γd(y) = Ky + L =
AE[m2]
A2E[m2] + E[w2]
(y − C) . (6)
By combining these, we obtain (K2 + λ)2E[w2] =
λE[m2] by assuming A 6= 0; which implies K2 =√
λE[m2]
E[w2] − λ. If we combine the equations above by
using A, and define the resulting mapping as T (A),
we obtain
A =
A
A2+E[w2]/E[m2](
A
A2+E[w2]/E[m2]
)2
+ λ
, T (A) . (7)
Note now that
A ≥ 1⇒
A
A2 + E[w
2]
E[m2]
< 1⇒ T (A) <
1
λ
,
A < 1⇒
A
A2 + E[w
2]
E[m2]
<
E[m2]
E[w2]
⇒ T (A) <
E[m2]
E[w2]
λ
,
which implies that the mapping defined by T (A) = A
can be viewed as a continuous function mapping the
compact convex set [0,max(E[m2]/E[w2], 1)/λ] to
itself. Therefore, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
[37], there exists A = T (A). Indeed, we can find
nonzero A for every 0 < λ < E[m
2]
E[w2] .
2 After finding
A, the values for K , C and L can also be obtained
based on the equilibrium equations in (5) and (6). For
the uniqueness of an informative fixed point, suppose
that there are two different nonzero fixed points: A1 =
2Recall that if A 6= 0 and 0 < λ < E[m
2]
E[w2]
, we have K2 =
√
λE[m2]
E[w2]
−
λ, which implies A = 1
K+λ/K
= ±
√√
E[w2]
λE[m2]
−
E[w2]
E[m2]
.
T (A1) and A2 = T (A2) and let γ = E[w2]/E[m2] for
simplicity. Then A1/T (A1) = A2/T (A2) implies
A21
A21 + γ
+ λ(A21 + γ) =
A22
A22 + γ
+ λ(A22 + γ)
⇒ (A21 −A
2
2)
( γ
(A21 + γ)(A
2
2 + γ)
+ λ
)
= 0 .
Hence, |A1| = |A2| is obtained, and since the map-
ping is defined from [0,max(E[m2]/E[w2], 1)/λ] to
itself, the nonzero fixed point is unique. Then the
encoder may choose the nonzero fixed point for the
informative equilibirum if it results in a lower cost
than the non-informative equilibrium (due to the cost
of communication, an informative equilibrium is not
always beneficial to the encoder compared to the non-
informative one).
2) Let λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2] and suppose that we are in an
equilibrium. Then, the encoder cost Je = E[(m−u−
b)2+λx2] reduces to Je = E[(m−u)2]+λE[x2]+b2
since the decoder in an equilibrium always chooses
u = E[m|y]. Through P = E[x2], the following
analysis leads to a lower bound on the encoder cost:
Je = b2 + λE[x2] + E[(m− u)2]
(a)
≥ b2 + λP + E[m2]e−2 sup I(X;Y )
= b2 + λP + E[m2]e
−2 12 log
(
1+ P
E[w2]
)
= b2 + λP +
E[m2]
1 + P/E[w2]
. (8)
Here, (a) follows from a rate-distortion theoretic bound
through the data-processing inequality (see for ex-
ample p. 96 of [1]). However, it follows that when
λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2], (8) is minimized at P = 0; that
is, the encoder does not signal any output. Hence, the
encoder engages in a non-informative equilibrium and
the minimum cost becomes E[m2] + b2 at this non-
informative equilibrium.
3) It is proved that an optimal encoder is affine such that
x = γe(m) = Am+C when the decoder is affine, that
is, u = γd(y) = Ky+L. Then, by inserting λ = 0 to
(2), m is obtained as m = KA (mα+mβ)2 +KC+L+b.
This holds for all mα and mβ with mα ≤ m ≤ mβ .
Thus, if the distance between mα and mβ is made
arbitrarily small, then it must be that KA = 1 and
KC + L + b = 0. On the other hand, it was shown
that an optimal decoder policy is affine if an encoder
is affine in (6). By combining KA = 1 and K =
AE[m2]
A2E[m2]+E[w2] , it follows that a real-valued solution
does not exist for any given affine coding parameter.
Remark 4.2: Note that, from (5) and (6), we have A =
1
K+λ/K , K =
AE[m2]
A2E[m2]+E[w2] , L = −KC and Ab = (AK −
1)C. From these equalities, we observe the following:
1) when λ = 0, it is shown in Theorem 4.1 that there is
not any fixed point solution to (7). However, if there
8is not a noisy channel between the encoder and the
decoder; i.e., the noise variance is zero (E[w2] = 0),
then (7) has a fixed point solution. Even when (7)
has a fixed point solution A, (5) and (6) cannot hold
together unless b = 0.
2) when the noise variance is zero (E[w2] = 0), there
is not any fixed point solution to (7) unless λ = 0.
Even when (7) has a fixed point solution A, (5) and
(6) cannot hold together unless b = 0.
3) when λ = 0 and the noise variance is zero (E[w2] =
0); the consistency of (5) and (6) can be satisfied if
only if b = 0. Hence, if b 6= 0, there cannot be a affine
equilibrium; the equilibrium has to be discrete due to
Theorem 3.2.
Thus, if either λ or E[w2] is 0, an affine equilibrium exists
only if λ, E[w2] and b are all 0.
C. Price of Anarchy and Comparison with Socially Optimal
Cost
In a game theoretic setup, the encoder and the decoder try
to minimize their individual costs, thus the game theoretic
cost can be found as minγe Je+minγd Jd. If the encoder and
the decoder work together to minimize the total cost, then the
problem can be regarded as a team problem and the resulting
cost is a socially optimal cost, which is minγe,γd(Je+ Jd).
In the game theoretic setup, because of the selfish behavior
of the players, there is some loss from the socially optimal
cost, and this loss is measured by the ratio between the
game theoretic cost and the socially optimal cost, which was
proposed as a price of anarchy [38]. In this part, it will be
shown that the game theoretic cost is higher than the socially
optimal cost as expected, and the information theoretic lower
bounds on the costs and their achievability will be discussed.
Theorem 4.2:
1) Let gi and gu represent the informative and the
non-informative equilibrium game costs, respectively.
Then, gi = 3
√
λE[m2]E[w2] + b2
√
E[m2]
λE[w2] − λE[w
2]
and gu = 2E[m2] + b2. Further, the total cost in the
game equilibrium is the following
J∗,g =
{
min{gi, gu} λ < E[m2]/E[w2]
gu λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2]
.
2) Let ti and tu represent the informative and the
non-informative team costs, respectively. Then, ti =
2
√
2λE[m2]E[w2]+ b
2
2 −λE[w
2] and tu = 2E[m2]+
b2
2 . Further, the socially optimal cost (the total cost in
the team setup) is the following
J∗,t =
{
min{ti, tu} λ < 2E[m2]/E[w2]
tu λ ≥ 2E[m2]/E[w2]
.
Proof:
1) Note from (5) and (6) that we have A = 1K+λ/K ,
K = AE[m
2]
A2E[m2]+E[w2] , L = −KC and Ab = C(AK −
1). Also we have (K2 + λ)2E[w2] = λE[m2] which
implies K2 =
√
λE[m2]
E[w2] −λ and λ < E[m
2]/E[w2] for
nonzero A. Recall that if λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2], then A =
C = K = L = 0, which implies the non-existence of
the informative linear (also affine) equilibrium. Thus,
for λ < E[m
2]
E[w2] , by using K
2 =
√
λE[m2]
E[w2] − λ, A =
1
K+λ/K , C =
Ab
AK−1 and L+b = −
C
A in (4), we have
J∗,e = 2
√
λE[m2]E[w2] + b2
√
E[m2]
λE[w2]
− λE[w2] .
Now recall that the optimal decoder policy is u∗ =
E[m|(y = Am+C+w)] = AE[m
2]
A2E[m2]+E[w2] (y−C), and
we have σ2e = σ2x−
σ2xy
σ2y
where e = x−E[x|y]. In this
case, x → m, y → y, σ2x → E[m
2], σxy → AE[m2]
and σ2y → A2E[m2] + E[w2]. Thus, we have
J∗,d = min
u=γd(y)
E[(m− u)2] = E[(m− E[m|y])2]
= σ2m −
σ2my
σ2y
= E[m2]−
A2(E[m2])2
A2E[m2] + E[w2]
=
√
λE[m2]E[w2] .
As a result, the game theoretic cost at the equilibrium
is found as
J∗,g = 3
√
λE[m2]E[w2] + b2
√
E[m2]
λE[w2]
− λE[w2] .
(9)
Recall that, if λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2], then J∗,e = E[m2]+
b2 and J∗,d = E[m2]; hence, J∗,g = 2E[m2] + b2. If
there were no cost of communication (consider the
cheap talk; i.e., remove λx2 from the encoder cost
function), then one could say that the informative
equilibria would always be beneficial to both the
encoder and the decoder; however, due to the cost
of communication, an informative equilibrium is not
always beneficial to the encoder when compared with
the non-informative one (i.e., for λ < E[m2]/E[w2],
it does not always hold that 2
√
λE[m2]E[w2] +
b2
√
E[m2]
λE[w2] − λE[w
2] < E[m2] + b2). For the re-
ceiver, however, information never hurts the perfor-
mance and the informative equilibria are more de-
sirable (i.e., for λ < E[m2]/E[w2], the inequality√
λE[m2]E[w2] < E[m2] always holds). As a result,
one can expect a non-informative equilibrium even if
λ < E[m2]/E[w2].
2) The part below aims to construct the socially optimal
affine setup. In this part, Je,t represents the team
cost minimized over the encoder policies for a given
decoder policy, Jd,t represents the team cost mini-
mized over the decoder policies for a given encoder
policy, and J∗,t represents the optimum team cost; i.e.,
9minimization over all affine encoding and decoding
policies as follows:
J∗,t = min
x=γe(m),u=γd(y)
E[(m−u−b)2+λx2+(m−u)2] .
Similar to the game theoretic analysis above, with the
given affine encoding policy x = γe(m) = Am + C
(then y = x+w = Am+C+w), the optimal decoder
policy can be found as follows (by completing the
square):
Jd,t = min
u=γd(y)
E[(m− u− b)2 + λx2 + (m− u)2]
= min
u=γd(y)
2E
[
(m− u−
b
2
)2 +
b2
4
+ λ
x2
2
]
.
Hence the optimal decoder policy can be chosen as
γd,t(y) = E[m− b2 | y]. Due to the joint Gaussanity of
m and y, the minimizer decoder policy is affine:
γd,t(y) = Ky + L =
AE[m2]
A2E[m2] + E[w2]
(y − C)−
b
2
.
(10)
Similar to the game theoretic analysis above, for
any affine decoder policy γd(y) = Ky + L with
y = γe(m) + w, the optimal encoder policy for the
team setup can be obtained as follows (by completing
the square):
Je,t = min
x=γe(m)
E[(m− u− b)2 + λx2 + (m− u)2]
= min
γe(m)
(2K2 + λ)E
[(
γe(m)−
(2m− 2L− b)K
2K2 + λ
)2]
+
b2K2 + λ
(
2E[m2] + (L+ b)2 + L2
)
2K2 + λ
+ 2K2E[w2] .
Hence, the optimal encoder γe(m) is
γe,t(m) = Am+ C =
(2m− 2L− b)
2K + λ/K
, (11)
and the minimum team cost is obtained as
J∗,t =
b2K2 + λ
(
2E[m2] + (L+ b)2 + L2
)
2K2 + λ
+ 2K2E[w2] . (12)
This implies that, in the team setup, an optimal en-
coder policy for a Gaussian source over a Gaussian
channel is a affine policy if the decoder policy is
chosen as affine.
In order to achieve the socially optimal cost J∗,t,
the optimal encoder policy γe∗,t(m) and the optimal
decoder policy γd∗,t(y) must satify the following
equalities by (10) and (11):
A =
2
2K + λ/K
, K =
AE[m2]
A2E[m2] + E[w2]
,
C =
A
2
(−2L− b) = −AL−
Ab
2
, L = −KC −
b
2
⇒C = −A
(
−KC −
b
2
)
−
Ab
2
= AKC .
Here, either AK = 1 or C = 0. If AK = 1,
then E[w2] = 0 which contradicts with the noise
assumption. Then C = 0 and L = −b/2. By using
the equalities for A and K above, one can obtain
2(K2 + λ/2)2E[w2] = λE[m2] by assuming A 6= 0;
which implies K2 =
√
λE[m2]
2E[w2] −
λ
2 . Since K
2 is
positive, λ cannot be greater than 2E[m
2]
E[w2] ; otherwise,
because of our assumption, A must be equal to 0
which implies that K = 0, and there does not
exist an informative affine team setup. Then K2 =√
λE[m2]
2E[w2] −
λ
2 and λ < 2E[m
2]/E[w2] for nonzero A.
Thus, for λ < 2E[m
2]
E[w2] , by using K
2 =
√
λE[m2]
2E[w2] −
λ
2 ,
A = 2K2K2+λ , C = 0 and L = −
b
2 in (12), we have
J∗,t = 2
√
2λE[m2]E[w2] +
b2
2
− λE[w2]m. (13)
Recall that, if λ ≥ 2E[m2]/E[w2], then J∗,t =
2E[m2]+ b
2
2 . Similar to the game theoretic setup, due
to the cost of the communication, the encoder and the
decoder may prefer the non-informative equilibrium
over the informative one (if 2
√
2λE[m2]E[w2]+ b
2
2 −
λE[w2] > 2E[m2] + b
2
2 ).
Theorem 4.3: The price of anarchy is always larger than
1, i.e., the sum of the costs under any Nash equilibria is
always larger than the socially optimal cost.
Proof: By Theorem 4.2, we have the following
J∗,g =
{
min{gi, gu} λ < E[m2]/E[w2]
gu λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2]
,
J∗,t =
{
min{ti, tu} λ < 2E[m2]/E[w2]
tu λ ≥ 2E[m2]/E[w2]
.
Notice that we have ti < gi for λ < E[m2]/E[w2] and
tu < gu always. Consider the following cases:
1) 0 < λ < E[m2]/E[w2] : There are four cases to be
considered:
a) min{gi, gu} = gi and min{ti, tu} = ti: Since
ti < gi, J
∗,t < J∗,g is satisfied.
b) min{gi, gu} = gi and min{ti, tu} = tu: Since
tu < ti < gi, J
∗,t < J∗,g is satisfied.
c) min{gi, gu} = gu and min{ti, tu} = ti: Since
ti < tu < gu < gi, J
∗,t < J∗,g is satisfied.
d) min{gi, gu} = gu and min{ti, tu} = tu: Since
tu < gu, J
∗,t < J∗,g is satisfied.
2) E[m2]/E[w2] ≤ λ < 2E[m2]/E[w2] : There are two
cases to be considered:
a) min{ti, tu} = ti: Since ti < tu < gu, J∗,t <
J∗,g is satisfied.
b) min{ti, tu} = tu: Since tu < gu, J∗,t < J∗,g is
satisfied.
3) λ ≥ 2E[m2]/E[w2] : Since tu < gu, J∗,t < J∗,g is
satisfied.
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Hence, one can observe that J∗,g > J∗,t always holds,
which shows that the price of anarchy is greater than 1, i.e.,
the game theoretic cost is always larger than the socially
optimal cost.
In the following, we discuss information theoretic lower
bounds on the performance of equilibria and socially optimal
strategies.
Theorem 4.4:
1) For the game setup, if λ ≥ E[m2]
E[w2] (i.e., non-informative
equilibria), the information theoretic lower bounds on
the costs are achievable.
2) For the game setup, if λ < E[m2]
E[w2] and b = 0, then the
information theoretic lower bounds on the costs are
achievable by linear policies.
3) For the game setup, if λ < E[m2]
E[w2] and b 6= 0, the
information theoretic lower bounds on the costs are
not achievable by affine policies.
4) For the team setup, the information theoretic lower
bounds on the costs are always (both in the informative
and non-informative equilibria) achievable by affine
policies.
Proof:
1) Recall that the encoder cost is Je = E[(m − u −
b)2 + λx2] and we know that this reduces to Je =
E[(m − u)2] + λE[x2] + b2 since the decoder always
chooses u = E[m|y]. From (8), we have a bound
on the encoder cost Je ≥ b2 + λP + E[m
2]
1+P/E[w2] where
P = E[x2] represents the power. This bound is
tight when the encoder and the decoder use linear
policies leading to jointly Gaussian random variables.
For λ < E[m2]/E[w2], a minimizer of this cost is
P ∗ =
√
E[m2]E[w2]
λ −E[w
2]. If we insert this value into
(8), we have Je ≥ 2
√
λE[m2]E[w2] + b2 − λE[w2].
By the same reasoning above, we also have Jd =
E[(m − u)2] ≥ E[m
2]
1+ P
E[w2]
≥
√
λE[m2]E[w2]. Hence,
the information theoretic lower bound on the game
cost Jg = Je + Jd is found as
Jg ≥ 3
√
λE[m2]E[w2] + b2 − λE[w2] . (14)
Through an analysis similar to the one in [1], one can
see that when λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2], (8) is minimized at
P = 0 (the encoder does not signal any output); thus
we obtain a non-informative equilibrium: The encoder
and the decoder do not engage in communications; i.e.,
A = 0 and K = 0 is an equilibrium. In this case the
encoder may be considered to be linear, but this is a
degenerate coding policy. This implies Jg ≥ 2E[m2]+
b2, and remember that J∗,g = 2E[m2] + b2 when λ ≥
E[m2]/E[w2], hence the information theoretic lower
bound is achievable in the non-informative equilibria.
2) From (9) and (14), it can be deduced that when b = 0,
the lower bound of the encoder cost is achievable by
linear policies; i.e., C = 0 and L = 0. When b = 0,
the problem corresponds to what is known as a soft-
constrained version of the quadratic signaling problem
where we append the constraint to the cost functional
(see page 96 of [1]).
3) If b 6= 0, then, from (9) and (14), one can observe
that the lower bound becomes unachievable by affine
policies since the power constraint related part of
the cost function, λx2, contains b2 related parameters
(recall C = AbAK−1 ). In this case, by modifying the
power from P to P − C2 (which must be posi-
tive) in the information theoretic inequalities; i.e.,
Je ≥ b2 + λP + E[m
2]
1+(P−C2)/E[w2] , then the minimum
game cost is obtained as Jg ≥ 3
√
λE[m2]E[w2] +
b2
√
E[m2]
λE[w2] − λE[w
2] which is the same cost that is
achieved by affine policies.
4) By following a similar approach to (8) for finding
the lower bound on the socially optimal cost, we can
obtain:
J t = E[(m− u− b)2 + λx2 + (m− u)2]
=
b2
2
+ λE[x2] + 2E
[(
m− u−
b
2
)2]
(a)
≥
b2
2
+ λP +
2E[m2]
1 + P/E[w2]
.
Here (a) holds since the decoder chooses u = E[m−
b
2 |y] and shifting does not affect the differential en-
tropy. Similar to the previous analysis, a minimizer
of this cost is P ∗ =
√
2E[m2]E[w2]
λ − E[w
2] for
λ < 2E[m2]/E[w2]. If we insert this value into the
total cost, we have
J t ≥ 2
√
2λE[m2]E[w2] +
b2
2
− λE[w2]. (15)
Recall that, if λ ≥ 2E[m2]/E[w2], then P = 0
becomes the minimizer, hence J t ≥ 2E[m2] + b
2
2
in the non-informative equilibrium. Remember that
J∗,t = 2E[m2] + b
2
2 in this case, thus the informa-
tion theoretic lower bound is achievable in the non-
informative equilibria. In addition, from (13) and (15),
for λ < 2E[m2]/E[w2] (which implies the informative
equilibria), it can easily be seen that the information
theoretic lower bound is achievable by affine policies
(actually the encoder policy is linear and the decoder
policy is affine).
We state the following summary.
1) If λ < E[m2]/E[w2] and b = 0, then the information
theoretic lower bound on the game cost is achievable
by the linear policies.
2) If λ < E[m2]/E[w2] and b 6= 0, then the information
theoretic lower bounds on the game cost are not
achievable by the affine policies; but they become
achievable after slight modification on the power pa-
rameter in the information theoretic inequality.
3) The team cost J∗,t in the affine equilibrium is always
equal to the information theoretic lower bound on the
team cost.
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4) The price of anarchy is always greater than 1: The
socially optimal cost is always lower than the cost in
any equilibrium.
5) In the game setup, the non-informative equilibrium
may be preferred over the informative equilibrium by
the encoder due to the cost of the signal λx2.
D. Stackelberg Setup
If we consider the Stackelberg setup of the signaling game
problem studied in this section; i.e. the encoder knows the
policy of the decoder, then it can be shown that the only
equilibrium is the linear equilibrium.
Theorem 4.5: The only equilibrium in the Stackelberg
setup of the signaling game is the linear equilibrium.
Proof: In the proof, first we assume the linear encoding
policy and show that the information theoretic lower bound
is achieved, then we conclude that the encoder policy must
be linear. Let the encoder policy be x = γe(m) = Am+C.
Due to the Stackelberg assumption, the encoder knows
that the decoder will use γd(y) = u = E[m|y] as an
optimal decoder policy to minimize the decoder cost, thus
u = γd(y) = AE[m
2]
A2E[m2]+E[w2] (y−C) where y = Am+C+w.
Then the goal of the encoder is to minimize the following:
J∗,e = min
x=γe(m)=Am+C
E[(m− u− b)2 + λx2]
= min
A, C
E
[(mE[w2]−AE[m2]w
A2E[m2] + E[w2]
− b
)2
+ λ(Am+ C)2
]
= min
A, C
E[m2](E[w2])2 +A2(E[m2])2E[w2]
(A2E[m2] + E[w2])2
+ b2
+ λA2E[m2] + λC2
= min
A, C
E[m2]E[w2]
A2E[m2] + E[w2]
+ b2 + λA2E[m2] + λC2 .
(16)
The optimal encoder cost in (16) is achieved for C∗ =
0, and A∗ = 0 for λ ≥ E[m2]/E[w2] and A∗ =√√
E[w2]
λE[m2] −
E[w2]
E[m2] for λ < E[m
2]/E[w2]. Then the op-
timal encoder cost is obtained as J∗,e = E[m2]+b2 for λ ≥
E[m2]/E[w2] and J∗,e = 2
√
λE[m2]E[w2] + b2 − λE[w2]
for λ < E[m2]/E[w2]. Note that these are the information
theoretic lower bounds in the proof of the first part of
Theorem 4.4 and these lower bounds are achieved when the
encoder and the decoder use linear policies jointly, which is
valid for the current case.
V. QUADRATIC SIGNALING GAME:
MULTI-DIMENSIONAL GAUSSIAN NOISY CASE
The scalar setup considered in Section IV can be extended
to the multi-dimensional Gaussian noisy signaling game
problem setup as follows. The encoder (DM 1) encodes
an n-dimensional zero-mean Gaussian random variable ~M
with the covariance matrix Σ ~M and sends the real-valued
n-dimensional random variable ~X . During the transmission,
the n-dimensional zero-mean Gaussian noise with the co-
variance matrix Σ ~W is added to ~X and the decoder (DM
2) receives ~Y = ~X + ~W . The policy space of DM 1, Γe,
and the policy space of DM 2, Γd, are the set of stochastic
kernels from Rn to Rn. The cost functions of the encoder
and the decoder are as follows: DM 1 aims to minimize
Je(γe, γd)
=
∫
ce(~m, ~x, ~u)γe(d~x|~m)γd(d~u|~y)P (d~y|~x)P (d~m),
whereas DM 2 aims to minimize
Jd(γe, γd)
=
∫
cd(~m, ~u)γe(d~x|~m)γd(d~u|~y)P (d~y|~x)P (d~m),
where P (d~y|~x) = P ( ~W ∈ d~y − ~x) with ~W ∼ N (0,Σ ~W ).
The cost functions are ce (~m, ~x, ~u) = ‖~m−~u−~b‖2+λ‖~x‖2
and cd (~m, ~u) = ‖~m− ~u‖2 where the lengths of the vectors
are defined in L2 norm and ~b is the bias vector.. Note that
we have appended a power constraint and an associated
multiplier. If λ = 0, this corresponds to the setup with no
power constraint at the encoder.
A. Affine Equilibria
Theorem 5.1:
1) If the encoder is linear (affine), the decoder, as an
MMSE decoder for a Gaussian source over a Gaussian
channel, is linear (affine).
2) If the decoder is linear (affine), then an optimal en-
coder policy for a multi-dimensional Gaussian source
over a multi-dimensional Gaussian channel is an affine
policy.
3) An equilibrium encoder policy γe(~m) =
A~m + ~C satisfies the equation A = T (A)
where T (A) =
(
FFT + λI
)−1
F and
F =
(
AΣ ~MA
T +Σ ~W
)−1
AΣ ~M .
4) There exists at least one equilibrium.
Proof:
1) Let the affine encoding policy be ~x = γe(~m) = A~m+
~C where A is an n×n matrix and ~C is an n×1 vector.
Then ~y = ~x+~w = A~m+ ~C+~w. The optimal cost of the
decoder, by the law of the iterated expectations, can
be expressed as J∗,d = min~u=γd(~y) E
[
‖~m− ~u‖2
∣∣~y].
Hence, a minimizer policy of the decoder is ~u =
γ∗,d(~y) = E [~m|~y]. Since both ~m and ~y are Gaussian,
then the optimal decoder is
E [~m|~y] = E[~m] + Σ ~M~Y Σ
−1
~Y ~Y
(~y − E[~y])
= Σ ~MA
T
(
AΣ ~MA
T +Σ ~W
)−1
(~y − ~C) . (17)
2) Let the affine decoding policy be ~u = γd(~y) = K~y+~L
where K is an n×n matrix and ~L is an n× 1 vector.
Then ~u = K~y+~L = K(~x+ ~w)+~L = Kγe(~m)+K~w+
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~L. By using the completion of the squares method, the
optimal cost is
J∗,e = min
~x=γe(~m)
E
[
‖~m− ~u−~b‖2 + λ‖x‖2
]
= E
[
min
~x=γe(~m)
E
[
‖~m− ~u−~b‖2 + λ‖x‖2
∣∣∣~m]]
= E
[
min
γe(~m)
E
[(
(KTK + λI)γe(~m)−KT
× (~m− ~L−~b)
)T(
KTK + λI
)−1
×
(
(KTK + λI)γe(~m)−KT (~m− ~L−~b)
)
+
(
~m− ~L−~b
)T(
I −K(KTK + λI)−1KT
)
×
(
~m− ~L−~b
)∣∣∣~m]
]
+ E
[
~wTKTK~w
]
.
Hence, the optimal γe(m) can be chosen as follows:
γ∗,e(~m) = A~m+ ~C =
(
KTK + λI
)−1
KT
×
(
~m− ~L−~b
)
. (18)
3) We have K = Σ ~MAT
(
AΣ ~MA
T +Σ ~W
)−1
and A =(
KTK + λI
)−1
KT from (17) and (18). By combin-
ing these, A = T (A) =
(
FFT + λI
)−1
F can be
obtained.
4) Since FFT is a real and symmetric matrix, it is
diagonalizable and can be written as FFT = QΥQ−1
for a diagonal Υ. Now consider ‖T (A)‖F where ‖·‖F
denotes the Frobenius norm:
‖T (A)‖F = tr
(( (
FFT + λI
)−1
F
)
×
( (
FFT + λI
)−1
F
)T)
= tr
(
(Υ + λI)−1Υ(Υ + λI)−1
)
=
n∑
i=1
υi
(υi + λ)2
, (19)
where υi, i = 1, . . . , n are the eigenvalues of FFT
and since FFT is positive semi-definite, all these
eigenvalues are nonnegative. Since λ > 0, we observe
the following:
υi ∈ [0, 1]⇒
υi
(υi + λ)2
<
1
λ2
,
υi ∈ (1,∞)⇒
υi
(υi + λ)2
<
υi
υ2i
=
1
υi
< 1 .
Hence, υi/(υi + λ)2 < max(1, 1/λ2) always holds.
Then, by (19), we have ‖T (A)‖F < nmax(1, 1/λ2),
which implies that T (A) can be viewed as a continu-
ous function mapping the compact convex set ‖A‖F ∈
[0, nmax(1, 1/λ2)] to itself. Therefore, by Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem [37], there exists A = T (A).
We note, however, that there always exist a non-informative
equilibrium (see Proposition 2.1, which also applies to the
signaling game discussed in this section). However, there
exist games with informative affine equilibria as we state in
the following (see Theorem 5.2).
Proposition 5.1: If either λ or Σ ~W is zero, an informative
affine equilibrium exists only if λ, Σ ~W and ~b are all zero.
Proof: Note that, from (17) and (18), we have A =(
KTK + λI
)−1
KT , K = Σ ~MA
T
(
AΣ ~MA
T +Σ ~W
)−1
,
~L = −K ~C and A~b = (AK − I)~C . From these equalities,
we can analyze the equilibrium as in the scalar case:
1) when λ = 0 and the noise is zero (Σ ~W = 0), then
A = K−1 and K = A−1 are obtained. Then A~b =
(AK−I)~C = 0, thus the consistency of the equalities
can be satisfied if only if ~b = 0. Hence, if ~b 6= 0, there
cannot exist an informative affine equilibrium. Recall
that in the multi-dimensional noiseless cheap talk, the
linearity of the equilibrium is shown for the uniform
source; here the source is Gaussian.
2) when λ = 0, then A = K−1 and AΣ ~MAT + Σ ~W =
K−1Σ ~MA
T are obtained. There does not exist a
solution to (7) unless the noise is zero (Σ ~W = 0).
Even when (7) has a fixed point solution A, (5) and
(6) cannot hold together unless ~b = 0.
3) when the noise is zero (Σ ~W = 0), then K = A−1 and
KTK + λI = KTA−1 are obtained. There does not
exist a solution to (7) unless λ = 0. Even when (7)
has a fixed point solution A, (5) and (6) cannot hold
together unless ~b = 0.
Remark 5.1: In the multi-dimensional case, fixed points
may not be unique: with λ = 1.0311 and
Σ ~M =


1.6421 0.1299 0.5713 0.2305
0.1299 1.4803 0.6810 0.4749
0.5713 0.6810 1.7312 0.4292
0.2305 0.4749 0.4292 1.3515

 ,
Σ ~W =


1.2742 0.1868 0.2318 0.0559
0.1868 1.8266 0.5955 0.3091
0.2318 0.5955 1.2377 0.4951
0.0559 0.3091 0.4951 1.5336

 ,
we can obtain two fixed points with different absolute-valued
elements as follows (recall that if A is a fixed point, −A is
also a fixed point):
A =


−0.1543 0.1762 0.0606 0.1117
0.1602 0.0159 0.1036 0.0279
−0.2000 −0.1879 −0.2700 −0.1565
0.0603 0.1052 0.1221 0.0824

 ,
A =


−0.2431 0.0738 −0.0752 0.0285
0.0293 −0.1351 −0.0966 −0.0948
0.1520 0.2181 0.2682 0.1735
−0.1003 −0.0801 −0.1236 −0.0683

 .
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Theorem 5.2: Let source ~M be a zero-mean n-
dimensional Gaussian random variable with covariance ma-
trix Σ ~M = diag{σ
2
m1 , . . . , σ
2
mn} where diag indicates a
diagonal matrix, and noise ~W be a zero-mean n-dimensional
Gaussian random variable with covariance matrix Σ ~W =
diag{σ2w1 , . . . , σ
2
wn}. Then an informative affine equilibrium
exists if λ < max{σ
2
m1
σ2w1
, . . . ,
σ2mn
σ2wn
}.
Proof: Since the source components are indepen-
dent and the noise components are independent, the n-
dimensional noisy signaling game problem turns into n in-
dependent scalar noisy signaling game problems as follows:
1) If the decoder uses the channels independently; i.e.,
ui = γ
d
i (yi) for i = 1, . . . , n, then the optimal cost of
the encoder will be
J∗,e = min
~x=γe(~m)
E
[
‖~m− ~u−~b‖2 + λ‖x‖2
]
= min
~x=γe(~m)
n∑
i=1
E[(mi − γ
d
i (yi)− bi)
2 + λx2i ]
=
n∑
i=1
min
~x=γe(~m)
E[(mi − γ
d
i (yi)− bi)
2 + λx2i ] .
Since, yi = xi+wi for each i = 1, . . . , n, the optimal
encoder also uses the channels independently; i.e.,
xi = γ
e
i (mi) for i = 1, . . . , n.
2) Similarly, if the encoder uses the channels indepen-
dently; i.e., xi = γei (mi) for i = 1, . . . , n, then the
optimal cost of the decoder will be
J∗,d = min
~u=γd(~y)
E
[
‖~m− ~u‖2
]
=
n∑
i=1
min
~u=γd(~y)
E[(mi − ui)
2] .
Since, yi = γei (mi) + wi for each i = 1, . . . , n, the
optimal decoder will also use channels independently;
i.e., ui = γdi (yi) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Thus, we have, in each dimension i (i = 1, . . . , n);
• the source Mi is a zero-mean Gaussian with variance
σ2mi ,
• the channel has the Gaussian noise Wi with zero-mean
and variance σ2wi ,
• the encoder’s goal is to find the optimal policy which
minimizes its cost minxi=γe(mi) E[(mi − ui − bi)2 +
λx2i ],
• the decoder’s goal is to find the optimal policy which
minimizes its cost minui=γd(yi) E[(mi − ui)2].
For each dimension, the informative affine equilibrium exists
if λ < σ2mi/σ
2
wi . For the multidimensional setup, the
existence of the informative equilibrium in at least one di-
mension implies the existence of the informative equilibrium
for the whole sytem. Hence, it is sufficient that the inequality
λ < σ2mi/σ
2
wi is valid for at least one dimension. As a
result, the condition for the existence of the informative
affine equilibrium becomes λ < max{σ
2
m1
σ2w1
, . . . ,
σ2mn
σ2wn
}.
Note that, from (17) and (18), by assuming |A| 6= 0, we
have λAΣ ~MA
T = KTKΣ ~W which is equivalent to
λ(AT )−1Σ ~MA
T = (KTK + λI)(KTK + λI)Σ ~W . (20)
Remark 5.2: Assuming all channels are informative, i.e.,
|A| 6= 0, we make the following observations.
• If the source is i.i.d.; i.e., Σ ~M = σ
2
mI , then (20)
becomes
λ(AT )−1σ2mIA
T = (KTK + λI)(KTK + λI)Σ ~W
⇒ λσ2m(Σ ~W )
−1 = (KTK + λI)(KTK + λI)
⇒ λσ2m(Σ ~W )
−1 ≥ λ2I
⇒ λI ≤ σ2m(Σ ~W )
−1 .
This result implies that λ must satisfy the inequality
λI ≤ σ2m(Σ ~W )
−1 for the i.i.d. source; otherwise, there
must be at least one non-informative channel; i.e., |A|
must be 0.
• If the channel noise is i.i.d.; i.e., Σ ~W = σ
2
wI , (since Σ ~M
is real-symmetric, it has the eigenvalue decomposition
as Σ ~M = QΛQ
T ), then (20) becomes
λ(AT )−1Σ ~MA
T = (KTK + λI)(KTK + λI)σ2wI
⇒
λ
σ2w
(AT )−1QΛQTAT = (KTK + λI)(KTK + λI)
⇒ (AT )−1QΛQTAT ≥ λσ2w .
This result implies that for each eigenvalue λ ~M of Σ ~M ,
λ must satisfy λ ≤ λ ~M/σ
2
w for the i.i.d. channel noise;
otherwise, there must be at least one non-informative
channel; i.e., |A| must be 0.
• For the general case, recall the Minkowski determinant
theorem, |A + B|1/n ≥ |A|1/n + |B|1/n which holds
for any non-negative n × n Hermitian matrix A and
B. This implies |A + B| ≥ |A| + |B|. By using this
inequality and (18),
|A| =
|K|
|KTK + λI|
≤
|K|
|K|2 + λn
.
Assuming |A| 6= 0, recall the equality λAΣ ~MA
T =
KTKΣ ~W . Taking the determinant of both sides,
|K|2|Σ ~W | = λ
n|A|2|Σ ~M | ≤ λ
n
(
|K|
|K|2 + λn
)2
|Σ ~M |
≤ λn
|K|2
λ2n
|Σ ~M | ⇒ λ
n ≤
|Σ ~M |
|Σ ~W |
.
The result can be interpreted as follows: If λ >(
|Σ ~M |
|Σ ~W |
)1/n
, then |A| = |K| = 0 in the equilibrium;
i.e., there must be at least one non-informative channel.
B. An information theoretic lower bound on the encoder cost
and the existence of informative equilibria
We end the section with an information theoretic lower
bound for the encoder cost; this serves us also to obtain
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condition for the existence of an informative equilibrium.
Let ~e = ~m−~u = ~m−E[~m|~y], then we have Σ~e = E[~e~eT ] =
E[(~m − E[~m|~y])(~m − E[~m|~y])T ]. From the information
theoretic inequalities;
I(~m; ~y) = h(~m)− h(~m|~y) = h(~m)− h(~m− E[~m|~y]|~y)
≥ h(~m)− h(~m− E[~m|~y])
≥ h(~m)−
1
2
log2((2πe)
n|Σ~e|)
=
1
2
log2((2πe)
n|Σ~m|)−
1
2
log2((2πe)
n|Σ~e|)
=
1
2
log2(|Σ~m|/|Σ~e|) .
Also from the rate-distortion theorem, the data processing
theorem and the channel capacity theorem:
R(D) ≤ min
f(~u|~m):E[‖~m−~u‖2]≤D
I(~m; ~u) ≤ I(~m; ~u)
≤ I(~x; ~y) ≤ max
f(~x):E[‖~x‖2]≤P
I(~x; ~y) ≤ C(P ) .
If we combine these, we obtain the following:
|Σ~e| ≥ |Σ~m|2
−2R(D) ≥ |Σ~m|2
−2I(~m;~u)
≥ |Σ~m|2
−2I(~x;~y) ≥ |Σ~m|2
−2C(P ) . (21)
Now consider the following:
E[‖~m− ~u‖2] = E[‖~e‖2] = tr Σ~e
(a)
≥ n
( n∏
i=1
Σ~e(i, i)
)1/n
(b)
≥ n
(
|Σ~e|
)1/n (c)
≥ n
(
|Σ~m|2
−2C(P )
)1/n
. (22)
Here, (a) follows from the inequality for the arithmetic
and geometric mean where Σ~e(i, i) stands for ith diagonal
element of Σ~e, (b) follows from the Hadamard inequality
(since Σ~e is a positive semi-definite matrix), and (c) follows
from (21). Now we will rewrite [39, Eq. (9.166)] which
presents the capacity of the additive colored Gaussian noise
channel with typo corrected:
C(P ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
2
log2
(
1 +
max(ν − λi, 0)
λi
)
,
where P = E[‖~x‖2], λ1, λ2, . . . , λn are the eigenvalues of
Σ~w and ν is chosen so that
∑n
i=1 max(ν − λi, 0) = nP .
Then we can obtain the following:
2−2C(P ) = 2
−2 1
n
n∑
i=1
1
2 log2
(
1+
max(ν−λi,0)
λi
)
=
n∏
i=1
(
1 +
max(ν − λi, 0)
λi
)−1/n
=
n∏
i=1
(max(ν, λi)
λi
)−1/n
=
(
∏n
i=1 λi)
1/n
(
∏n
i=1max(ν, λi))
1/n
(a)
≥
(|Σ~w|)
1/n
(P +
∑n
i=1
λi
n )
=
(
|Σ~w|
)1/n(
P +
trΣ~w
n
)−1
. (23)
Here, (a) holds, since our assumption ∑ni=1 max(ν −
λi, 0) = nP implies
∑n
i=1max(ν, λi) = nP +
∑n
i=1 λi
and (
∏n
i=1max(ν, λi))
1/n ≤
∑n
i=1 max(ν, λi)/n = P +∑n
i=1 λi/n holds by the inequality for the arithmetic and
geometric mean. If we insert (23) to (22),
E[‖~m− ~u‖2] ≥ n
(
|Σ~m|
(
|Σ~w|
)1/n(
P +
trΣ~w
n
)−1)1/n
= n(|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
1/n2
(
P +
trΣ~w
n
)−1/n
. (24)
The encoder costs reduces to Je = E[‖~m−~u‖2]+λE[‖~x‖2]+
‖~b‖2 since the decoder always chooses ~u = E[~m|~y]. Then,
by (24),
Je = ‖~b‖2 + λE[‖~x‖2] + E[‖~m− ~u‖2]
≥ ‖~b‖2 + λP + n(|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
1/n2
(
P +
trΣ~w
n
)−1/n
.
(25)
The minimizer of this function can be found by the local
perturbation condition:
λ−(|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
1/n2
(
P +
trΣ~w
n
)− 1
n
−1
= 0
⇒ λ = (|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
1/n2
(
P +
trΣ~w
n
)− 1
n
−1
(a)
≤ (|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
1/n2
(
(|Σ~w|)
1/n
)− 1
n
−1
= (|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
−1/n .
Here, (a) follows from the nonnegativeness of P and
the inequality for the arithmetic and geometric mean and
the Hadamard inequality, similar to (22). Hence, if λ <
(|Σ~m|)
1/n(|Σ~w|)
−1/n
, the lower bound is minimized at a
nonzero P value, but if λ ≥ (|Σ~m|)1/n(|Σ~w|)−1/n, the
minimizer P becomes zero. Finally, if channels and source
are assumed to be i.i.d.; i.e., Σ~m = σ2mI and Σ~w = σ2wI
where I is n × n identity matrix, and the encoder and the
decoder use linear policies, then (25) becomes tight and can
be interpreted as follows: If λ > (|Σ~m|)1/n(|Σ~w|)−1/n =
σ2m/σ
2
w, then (25) is minimized at P = 0; that is, the encoder
does not signal any output. Hence, the encoder engages in an
non-informative equilibrium and the minimum cost becomes
E
[
‖~m‖2
]
+‖~b‖2 at this non-informative equilibrium. Recall
that this is analogous to the analysis in the scalar setup (8).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For a strategic information transmission problem under
quadratic criteria with a non-zero bias term leading to a
mismatch in the encoder and the decoder objective functions,
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria have been investigated in a
number of setups. It has been proven that for any scalar
source, the quantized nature of Nash equilibrium policies
hold, whereas all Stackelberg equilibrium policies are fully
informative. Further, it has been shown that the Nash equi-
librium policies may be non-discrete and even linear for a
multi-dimensional cheap talk problem, unlike the scalar case.
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The additive noisy channel setup with Gaussian statistics has
also been studied, such a case leads to a signaling game due
to the communication constraints in the transmission. Condi-
tions for the existence of affine Nash equilibrium policies as
well as general informative Nash equilibria are presented
for both the scalar and multi-dimensional setups. Lastly,
we proved that the only equilibrium in the Stackelberg
noisy setup is the linear equilibrium. Our findings provide
further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal
in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to
conditions for the presence of active information transmis-
sion in strategic environments. Recently, we have extended
our analysis in this paper to study dynamic signaling games
[40].
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